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U.S.

V. BAILEY: AN EXPANSION OF FEDERAL CLEAN WATER

ACT JURISDICTION
ANTHONY CASH*

I. INTRODUCTION
It is easier to seek forgiveness than permission. While this widely
quoted piece of cynical wisdom holds true in many cases, an attorney must
often give the opposite advice. In the wake of several federal circuit court
decisions interpreting the scope of federal jurisdiction under the Clean
Water Act (CWA),I any attorney wishing to give a client sound advice must
direct that client to seek the permission of the Army Corps of Engineers
(Corps) or the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), pursuant to 33
2
U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1342, 1344, prior to beginning a construction project in
many wetlands.
Construction in wetlands is exactly the situation which precipitated
the litigation in U.S. v. Bailey.3 In Bailey, the Eighth Circuit addressed the
issue of what legal test would be used to determine whether wetlands fall
under the jurisdiction of the CWA. 4 In answering that question, the Eighth
Circuit expanded CWA jurisdiction over wetlands by deciding that
jurisdiction can be established if either of two tests proposed by the
plurality decision in the Supreme Court case of Rapanos v. U.S. are met.
In doing this, the Eighth Circuit has employed a Rapanos decision intended
to limit the scope of CWA jurisdiction to instead expand that jurisdiction.
This Comment will examine the Eighth Circuit's decision in U.S. v.
Bailey. First, an examination of the prior law will describe the statutes and
cases that led to the Eighth Circuit's decision. Second, the facts, reasoning,
and holding of Bailey will be explicated. Finally, the implications of Bailey
on CWA jurisdiction, the success of Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion in
* Technical Editor, KENTUCKY JOURNAL OF EQUINE, AGRICULTURE, AND NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW, 2010-2011. B.A. 2004 University of Louisville; J.D. expected May 2011, University
of Kentucky College of Law.
1 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 -1387
(2006).
2 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1342, 1344 (2010) (establishing power to and procedure by which, the
Administrator of the EPA and the Secretary of the Army, acting through the Corps, issue permits for the
discharge of pollutants).
United States v. Bailey, 571 F.3d. 791, 795 (8th Cir. 2009).
4
Id. at 796-799.
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
6
Bailey, 571 F.3d at 799.
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Rapanos becoming law, and the impact Bailey has on correctly advising
clients who face possible CWA jurisdiction over wetlands they wish to
develop will be discussed.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Bailey case addressed the scope of federal jurisdiction under
the CWA. The CWA declares as one of its goals that "that the discharge of
pollutants into ... navigable waters be eliminated."7 The CWA defines the
"navigable waters" it wishes to regulate as "the waters of the United States,
The term "navigable waters" under the
including the territorial seas."
CWA has long been interpreted by regulatory agencies, and approved by
the courts, to include more than traditional navigable-in-fact waters that
have generally been held to be the limits of Congress's Commerce Clause
power to regulate waters in the United States. 9 According to the Corps,
"waters of the United States" for the purpose of the CWA includes
"[w]etlands adjacent to waters."10 Furthermore, the CWA prohibits
discharge of any "pollutants" into the waters of the United States.1 I The
term "pollutants" includes "rock, sand, [and] cellar dirt."l 2 Thus, any
construction project requiring the use of fill dirt or a "pollutant" in any
wetland adjacent to a "water of the United States" is subject to a licensing
requirement under the CWA.
In light of the sweeping nature of federal regulatory power over
land use in wetlands, the United States Supreme Court addressed the limits
of CWA jurisdiction over wetlands most recently in Rapanos v. U.S. 13 As
the ensuing discussion of U.S. v. Bailey will indicate, the federal circuits'
application of Rapanos has done little to limit the expansion of this broad
regulatory power or to provide developers and their attorneys with
meaningful guidance as to whether particular wetlands fall under CWA
jurisdiction. Rapanos, decided in 2006, produced a plurality opinion with
three different proposed methods of determining whether a wetland falls
under CWA jurisdiction.14 First, Justice Scalia's plurality opinion proposed
a strict geographic test.15 Next, Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion

'33 U.S.C. §1251(a) (1) (2006).
' 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (7) (2006).
9 Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715, 723-24 (2006) (providing a history of federal case law concerning
the interpretation of the phrase "navigable waters" and its increasing breath).
10 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (a) (7) (2010) (defining the word "waters" in its previous provisions).
" 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2006).
12 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (6) (2006).
13 Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
4 Bailey, 571 F.3d 791, 797-98.
" Bailey, 571 F.3d at 797 (citing Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 742(plurality opinion)).
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proposed a substantial nexus test. 16 Finally, Justice Stevens' dissenting
opinion argued that jurisdiction was appropriate if either test was met. 17
The Eighth Circuit in U.S. v. Bailey faced the decision of which of the
proposed tests to adopt.
A. U.S. v. Bailey: Facts
Appellant Gary Bailey's decision to appeal an injunction from the
Federal District Court of Minnesota ordering him to return a wetland he had
begun developing to its original condition forced the Eighth Circuit to
Bailey had begun residential
choose between the Rapanos tests.18
development of a thirteen acre tract of land bordering the Lake of the
Of these thirteen acres, approximately twelve
Woods (Lake) in 1998.
acres were wetlands as defined by the Corps. 20 In the early 1990's, Bailey
had requested a permit to evacuate a harbor on this land, which the Corps
granted; however, this permit excluded any permission for Bailey to use fill
material for the development of residential or commercial properties.21
Bailey did not apply for a new permit before beginning his 1998
Instead, he hired a contractor to build a road on the site
development.
without such permission.23 This road ran parallel to the shore line of the
Lake and was 66 feet wide and roughly a quarter mile long.24 On June 11,
1998, before the road was completed, the local Soil and Water
Conservation District advised Bailey's contractor that Bailey did not
possess the proper permits for his road construction.25 The contractor
quickly halted construction.26 In response, Bailey filed a Local-StateFederal Notification Form, in which he asserted to the County that he was
building an access road for logging.27 Bailey then instructed the contractor
to resume work and he completed the road, topping it with 2000 yards of
On this date the Corps received a copy of
gravel by August 17, 1998.
29
form.
notification
Bailey's

6 Bailey, 571 F.3d at 797-798 (citing Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
" Bailey, 571 F.3d at 798 (citing Rapanos,547 U.S. at 810 n. 14 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
'sBailey, 571 F.3d at 794.
'9 Id. at 795.
20
d
21 id
22 id
23 Id.
24

Bailey, 571 F.3d at 795.

25 Id.
26id
27

28
29

d
id
id
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The Corps treated this as an after-the-fact permit application and,
on September 17, 1998, instructed Bailey to cease work on the road until it
granted him a permit. 30 The Corps further informed Bailey that if it denied
his permit, he would be responsible for restoring the wetlands to their
previous condition.31 Despite these warnings, Bailey worked to dedicate
the road to the county and proceeded to make the improvements necessary
to meet county regulations in an effort to ensure that the county would be
responsible for maintenance of the road.32 On June 12, 2001, three years
after the completion of the road, the Corps denied Bailey's permit
application and ordered Bailey to restore the property at his own expense.
Bailey refused to comply and the United States brought an enforcement
action in Federal District Court. The Court affirmed the Corps' order
against Bailey, prompting him to appeal to the Eighth Circuit. 3 4
III. EIGHTH CIRCUIT APPLICATION OF KENNEDY'S CONCURRENCE
Bailey appealed on a number of grounds, one being that "the
district court erred in applying Justice Kennedy's opinion in Rapanos."3 5
The Eighth Circuit ultimately disagreed and ruled that jurisdiction may be
found if either test proposed by the Rapanos Court was met.36 In reaching
this decision, the Eighth Circuit relied heavily on its analysis of its sister
circuits' treatment of Rapanos and Marks v. United States.37 While
Rapanos establishes the scope of CWA jurisdiction, Marks explains how
federal courts are to interpret plurality opinions.
A Supreme Court
divided not in outcome but reasoning, is exactly what the Eighth Circuit
faced in interpreting Rapanos.39 In cases like Rapanos, Marks mandates
that "the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those
Members who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest possible
grounds." 40
In Bailey, the Eighth Circuit faced the difficult task of determining
the "narrowest possible grounds" between Justice Scalia's plurality opinion
and Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Rapanos. As Marks indicates,
the narrowest possible grounds on which these opinions agree will be
30

Bailey 571 F.3d at 795.

3 1 Id.

1

d. at 796.

3

Id.

3

Bailey, 571 F.3d at 796.
Id. at 799.

16

1 See Id at 798-99 (utilizing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977) as a guide to the
analysis of Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715).
3 Bailey, 571 F.3d at 798 (citing Marks, 430 U.S. 188 (1977)).
3 Bailey, 571 F.3d at 797-98.
4o Id. at 798 (quoting Marks, 430 U.S. at 193).
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viewed as the prevailing law in determining CWA jurisdiction over
wetlands. However, the Eighth Circuit acknowledged that "[b]ecause there
is little overlap between the plurality's and Justice Kennedy's opinions, it is
difficult to determine which holding is the narrowest.,A The examination
below of the Rapanos decision illustrates the fundamental incompatibility
between the plurality and the concurrence in Rapanos.
First, Justice Scalia's plurality opinion in Rapanos began its
analysis by concluding that based upon the definitions section of the CWA,
"the CWA authorizes federal jurisdiction only over 'waters."'4 2 Applying a
textualist reading to the term "waters" and using the definition of Webster's
New InternationalDictionary (2nd ed. 1952), Justice Scalia concluded that
"waters," as used in the CWA apylies only to "relatively permanent,
Therefore, Justice Scalia contended
standing or flowing bodies of water.'
that CWA jurisdiction over wetlands should be determined by employing a
two prong test. The first prong of the test requires that a channel adjacent
to the wetland contain "wate[r] of the United States."4 5 According to
Justice Scalia, a body of water is "wate[r] of the United States" if it is a
"relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate
navigable waters."46 The second prong of the test requires that the wetland
have a continuous surface connection to "wate[r] of the United States" as
determined by the first prong of the test. 47 Therefore, Justice Scalia's
opinion establishes a strictly geographic two pronged test to decide whether
a wetland is subject CWA jurisdiction. Though applying a restrictive
standard to the finding of CWA jurisdiction, Justice Scalia makes clear that
the plurality's opinion only applies to "dredge or fill" materials, which are,
by design, supposed to remain in place and not flow downstream. 48
Because this test would only apply in such narrow circumstances, the
plurality held that the jurisdictional decision in Rapanos should be
remanded for further determination. 49
Justice Kennedy's concurrence agreed with the remand outcome
reached by the plurality, but proposed an entirely different method to
Justice
determine jurisdiction based upon entirely different reasoning.
Kennedy looked to the decision in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook

Bailey, 571 F.3d at 798.
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 731 (plurality opinion) (citing 33 U.S.C.
4
1 d. at 732.
" Id at 742.
41

42

46Id.
47id
4

Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 743-44.

49

Id. at 757.

5 Id. at 787 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

§ 1362

(7) (2006)).
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County. v. Army Corps of Engineers5 and decided that the determination of
whether CWA jurisdiction existed over a wetland depended on the finding
of a "significant nexus" between the wetland and waters that "are or were
navigable in fact or that could be reasonably made so." 52 Justice Kennedy
further cited to United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.53 and stated
that the dispositive element in that case was the determination that an
agency's interpretation of a statute was "reasonable and not in conflict with
the expressed intent of Congress." 54 Therefore, Justice Kennedy concluded
that an assertion of jurisdiction under the CWA over a wetland by the Corps
or the EPA will be deemed reasonable and, consequently, permissible if
there is a "significant nexus" between the wetland and a navigable water.
Because of the vastly different tests proposed by the plurality and
concurrence in Rapanos, the Eighth Circuit had a difficult choice in
determining, as required by Marks, which of these opinions contained the
narrowest grounds for determining CWA jurisdiction. Therefore, the Eighth
Circuit looked to other federal circuits for guidance.55 First, the Court
acknowledged that three circuits, the Seventh, the Ninth, and the Eleventh,
had held Justice Kennedy's grounds to be the narrowest.56 However, the
Seventh and the Ninth Circuits also stated that there may be occasions
where the plurality's test would apply.5 7 The Fifth and Sixth Circuits had
not addressed the issue of which grounds to apply directly; instead, those
courts reasoned that defendants in the cases before them qualified under
both tests.5 8 Only the First Circuit, however, had concluded that no
reconciliation was possible between the plurality and concurrence and thus
adopted Justice Stevens' suggestion to find jurisdiction if either test was
met.59
The First Circuit, in United States v. Johnson,60 articulated the
following problem in support of its position:

s1Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
52 Rapanos, 547 U.S at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Solid Waste Agency
of N. Cook
County, 531 U.S. at 167,172).
5 U.S. v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
s' Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 766 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Riverside Bayview Homes,
Inc., 474 U.S. at 131).
5s Bailey, 571 F.3d at 798-99.
'6 Bailey, 571 F.3d at 798 (citing United States v. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208, 1221-22 (11th
Cir. 2007); N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 2007); United
States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 724-25 (7th Cir. 2006) (per curiam)).
s7 Bailey, 571 F.3d at 798-99 (citing N. Cal. River Watch, 496 F.3d at 999-1000; Gerke
Excavating, 464 F.3d at 725).
ss Bailey, 571 F.3d at 799 (citing United States v. Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200, 210-13 (6th
Cir.2009); United States v. Lucas, 516 F.3d 316, 327 (5th Cir. 2008)).
'9 Bailey, 571 F.3d at 799 (citing United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 66 (1st Cir. 2006)).
6 United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2006).
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The cases in which Justice Kennedy would limit federal
jurisdiction are not a subset of the cases in which the
plurality would limit jurisdiction.... [I]n cases where there
is a small surface water connection to a stream or brook,
the plurality's jurisdictional test would be satisfied, but
Justice Kennedy's balancing of interests might militate
against finding a significant nexus. In such a case, if Justice
Kennedy's test is the single controlling test (as advocated
by the Seventh and Ninth Circuits), there would be a
bizarre outcome - the court would find no federal
jurisdiction even though eight Justices (the four members
of the plurality and the four dissenters) would all agree that
federal authority should extend to such a situation. This
possibility demonstrates the shortcomings of the Marks
formulation in applying Rapanos."
As the First Circuit indicated, there are situations where the
plurality's strict geographic test would allow CWA jurisdiction and
Kennedy's test would deny jurisdiction. The Eighth Circuit found the
reasoning of the First Circuit to be persuasive.62 Therefore, the Court
adopted the position that CWA jurisdiction existed if either Justice
Kennedy's test or the plurality's test were met. 63 Applying Justice
Kennedy's "significant nexus" test, the Eighth Circuit held that Bailey's
wetlands fell under CWA jurisdiction and that Bailey had not presented
enough evidence to create any genuine issues of material fact concerning
that determination. Thus, the district court correctly granted the summary
judgment against Bailey.6
IV. IMPLICATIONS

The implications of the Eighth Circuit's decision in Bailey to adopt
an either-or approach to the Rapanos' tests are serious and wide ranging.
First, Bailey forces Rapanos to expand CWA jurisdiction while the
Supreme Court clearly meant to limit such jurisdiction with its decision.
Second, and following from the first, Bailey establishes a precedent that
dissenting opinions can be used to interpret plurality decisions of superior
courts. Finally, Bailey's either-or approach casts serious doubts as to how
attorneys should advise their clients regarding applications for permits
under the CWA.
61

d at 64.

62Bailey, 571 F.3d at 799.
63

ida

6'

Id at 802-03.
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A. An Expansion of FederalPowerfrom an Attempt to Limit Federal
Power
There can be no doubt that Justice Scalia's plurality opinion and
Justice Kennedy's concurrence were both intended to limit the scope of
federal regulatory jurisdiction under the CWA. The plurality's desire to
limit jurisdiction is best illustrated by the only endorsement given of Justice
Kennedy's concurrence: "Justice Kennedy's disposition would disallow
some of the Corps' excesses, and in that respect is a more moderate flouting
of statutory command than Justice Stevens' [dissent]." 65 More importantly,
the plurality's decision delineates an objective test to determine jurisdiction.
As discussed above, Justice Scalia's plurality opinion would only allow
CWA jurisdiction over wetlands being filled with dredge material if the
wetland had continuous surface connection to a relatively permanent body
of water that is connected to a navigable water of the United States.
Because this is a straightforward factual determination, the Corps and the
EPA would not have any discretion to classify wetlands as falling under
CWA jurisdiction if they could not provide evidence to support both prongs
of Scalia's test. Therefore, the plurality opinion sought to vastly limit the
scope of CWA jurisdiction.
Justice Kennedy also clearly intended his concurrence to limit the
scope of CWA jurisdiction over wetlands. Justice Kennedy approvingly
cited Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County. v. Army Corps of
Engineer (SWANCC)67 throughout his opinion.68 Specifically, Justice
Kennedy stated that "in SWANCC the Court rejected the Corps' assertion of
jurisdiction over isolated ponds and mudflats bearing no evident connection
to navigable-in-fact waters."69 SWANCC was the most recent Supreme
Court decision that articulated the limits of CWA jurisdiction prior to
Rapanos. Chief Justice Rehnquist penned the opinion in SWANCC and
expressed concern over giving too great an authority to administrative
bodies. 71 When the Supreme Court refused to grant CWA jurisdiction in
SWANCC, the Court expressed concerns over the expansion of Commerce
Clause Power beyond its proper limits. 72 Justice Kennedy asserted that the
limitations placed on CWA jurisdiction by SWANCC were appropriate as it
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 756 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 742-44 (pluralirty opinion).
67 Solid Waste Agency offN Cook Cnty., 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
61 See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 759-787 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
69
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 779 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
'0 Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty., 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (refusing to allow CWA
jurisdiction in non-navigable, isolated, intrastate waters five years prior to the Rapanos decision).
n Solid Waste Agency ofN. Cook Cnty., 531 U.S.. at 162,169.
61
6

72 Id

at 173.
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is a wetlands' "significant nexus" to "navigable waters" that grants CWA
jurisdiction over those wetlands "as waters of the United States." 73
Justice Kennedy's approval and employment of the reasoning from
SWANCC in his Rapanos concurrence illustrates his attempt to limit CWA
jurisdiction with his opinion. In addition, Justice Kennedy asserted a
concern that the plurality's strict geographic test may permit jurisdiction
over waters that are far beyond the traditional scope of the CWA because
the plurality would allow jurisdiction to exist where conditions met the
geographic test but where no substantial nexus existed between the
wetlands to be regulated and a navigable body of water. 74 As in Justice
Scalia's opinion, Justice Kennedy's concurrence is an attempt to limit
CWA jurisdiction over wetlands that do not bear some kind of relation to
navigable waters of the United States.
Though clearly both the opinions of Justices Kennedy and Scalia in
Rapanos are concerned about overreaching by the EPA and the Corps, the
either-or approach adopted by the Eighth Circuit in Bailey expands federal
jurisdiction. By allowing either test to control, the Eighth Circuit has set up
a situation in which jurisdiction that would be precluded by the "significant
nexus" test employed in SWANCC and advanced by Justice Kennedy in
Rapanos could still qualify for regulation under the CWA.
For example, imagine a developer who wishes to fill a permanent
wetland that is connected by a small stream to a lake that qualifies as a
navigable body of water. At great expense, the developer hires an expert
who verifies that filling the wetland will have no effect on the water quality
of the lake. Justice Kennedy predicted such a case when he pointed out that
"in many cases wetlands adjacent to tributaries covered by this standard
might appear little more related to navigable-in-fact waters than were the
isolated ponds held to fall beyond the [CWA's] scope in SWANCC." 7 5 No
significant nexus is shown between the wetland and the navigable water in
the above example. However, if a court should apply the either-or standard
of Bailey, the developer's wetlands would still qualify for CWA regulation
under Justice Scalia's test. The wetland would qualify despite not
possessing the "significant nexus" required by Justice Kennedy's
concurrence because it is a "water of the United States"
and is physicall/
connected by an overland water route to a navigable body of water.
Therefore, though the Supreme Court clearly intended Rapanos to limit
CWA jurisdiction, the Bailey either-or approach would expand jurisdiction
beyond what was available under the "significant nexus" test of SWANCC.

" Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 776-77 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
74 id.
7

1 d. at 781-82.

76 See Rapanos, 547

U.S. 747 (plurality opinion).
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B. DissentingOpinions as ControllingOpinions
Following from the expansion of CWA jurisdiction under the
Bailey either-or approach is the problem that the dissenting opinion of
Justice Stevens in Rapanos has effectively become controlling law. Justice
Stevens closed his dissent in the following manner: "[g]iven that all four
Justices who have joined this opinion would uphold the Corps' jurisdiction
in both of these cases - and in all other cases in which either the plurality's
or Justice Kennedy's test is satisfied -on remand each of the judgments
should be reinstated if either of those tests is met."77 When the Eighth
Circuit adopted the either-or approach endorsed by Justice Stevens, the
Court did not follow the mandate of Marks that "the holding of the Court
may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in
the judgment on the narrowest possible grounds." 78 An adoption of the
either-or approach clearly ignores the intention of both the plurality and
concurring opinions in Rapanos, and, instead, allows the dissent of Justice
Stevens to become law.
The Eleventh Circuit, in the case of United States v. Robison,79
delineated the problem with adopting the either-or approach, adopted by the
Eighth Circuit in Bailey.80 In Robison, the Eleventh Circuit explained its
decision to employ only Justice Kennedy's concurrence by contrasting the
implications of its adoption of the "substantial nexus" test to the
implications of adopting an either-or approach: "[w]e are controlled by
the decisions of the Supreme Court. Dissenters, by definition, have not
joined the Court's decision. In our view, Marks does not direct lower courts
interpreting fractured Supreme Court decisions to consider the positions of
those who dissented.',82 The expansion of CWA jurisdiction by the Eighth
Circuit's Bailey decision when the Supreme Court intended to limit such
jurisdiction illustrates the problem with relying upon dissents to interpret
any divided courts' opinions. As the Eleventh Circuit stated in Robison,
allowing Justice Stevens' dissent in Rapanos to become law by adopting an
either-or test would conflict with Marks command to find the narrowest
grounds on which those justices who participated in the decision of the
court agreed.83 In essence, the reliance on a dissenting opinion to interpret
the majority in a divided decision can empower a lower court to flout the
authority of a superior court.
"Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 810 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
' Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 169 n. 15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)).
7 United States v. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208 (11 th Cir. 2007).
s Id. at 1221-22.
81Id.
82 Id. at 1221 (citing King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 783 (D.C.Cir. 1991) (en banc)).
" See Robison, 505 F.3d at 1221.
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C. Advising Clients in a Post-BaileyEra
Currently, only the Eleventh Circuit has completely foreclosed the
use of the either-or approach in applying Rapanos.84 The either-or
approach has been embraced not only by the Eighth Circuit in Bailey but
also by the First Circuit in United States v. Johnson. Thus, there is no
consensus among the circuits concerning what approach should be used
when analyzing CWA jurisdiction cases concerning the development and
filling of wetlands. Furthermore, the Northern District of Texas has refused
to apply either Justice Scalia's or Justice Kennedy's Rapanos test and
instead has relied on previous precedent.86 The District Court stated that
"[w]ithout any clear direction on determining a significant nexus, this Court
will do exactly as Chief Justice Roberts declared-'feel [its] way on a caseby-case basis." 8 7
This situation poses a serious problem for attorneys attempting to
advise their clients regarding wetlands development and the CWA. The
best outcome for a developer/client would be if the developer's attorney
could advise the developer with a high degree of certainty whether the
wetland to be developed was subject to CWA jurisdiction. A high degree
of certainty is preferable because the expenses and time involved in the
application process for a CWA wetlands permit are substantial. On
average, an "applicant for an individual permit spends 788 days and
$271,596 in completing the process, and the average applicant for a
nationwide permit spends 313 days and $28,915 - not counting costs of
mitigation or design changes. '[O]ver $1.7 billion is spent each year by the
private and public sectors obtaining wetlands permits."' 8 8 These are steep
costs that most clients would prefer to avoid. However, because of the state
of confusion over what method will be used to determine CWA jurisdiction
over wetlands, a high degree of certainty is impossible. Therefore, unless a
client's land falls within the jurisdiction of a federal circuit that has clearly
expressed what method will be used to find CWA jurisdiction, the safest
advice that an attorney can give is for their clients to seek CWA permits if
their wetlands would meet any test articulated in Rapanos.

84 Bailey, 571 F.3d at 798-99 (explaining that the Seventh. Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have
held that Justice Kennedy's test must govern the particular cases each has considered; however, the
Seventh and Ninth have not foreclosed the possibility of utilizing the either-or rule).
85Id. at 799 (citing United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 66 (1st Cir. 2006)).
86 See United States v. Chevron Pipe Line Co., 437 F.Supp.2d 605,611, 613
(N.D.Tex. 2006).
" Id. at 613.
88 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 721 (citing Sunding & Zilberman, The Economics
of Environmental
Regulationby Licensing: An Assessment of Recent Changes to the Wetland PermittingProcess, 42 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 59, 74-76, 81 (2002).
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V. CONCLUSION
Because of the many problems posed by the Bailey either-or
method for determining CWA jurisdiction, this issue is ripe for a decision
by the Supreme Court. Absent another ruling on the issue, the Federal
Courts, attorneys, and developers of wetlands must do their best to feel
through each CWA jurisdiction matter on a case by case basis.

